Obviously, I am required to hate it. Not only am I contractually required to oppose goo-gooism* in all its forms because of my past affiliation with the Institute for Bad Goverment (the IGS at University of California, Berkeley), I made my early career by pushing back against goo-gooism in redistricting reform specifically.
But, Issue 1 here in Ohio? Um... Uh...
So here's the deal on redistricting and goo-gooism. One of the central problems with goo-gooism is mixing up multiple forms of gerrymandering. A partisan gerrymander is not the same thing as a bipartisan gerrymander. Partisan gerrymanders distort representation. Under a partisan gerrymander, one party wins more seats than its proportion of the vote based on a "pack and crack" strategy. If I pack your party's voters inefficiently into a small number of districts, and then give my own party a slimmer majority in more districts, I win more seats. Since that strategy gives one party more seats than its share of the vote, it distorts representation. I don't support partisan gerrymanders. Where I get into it with goo-goos is over bipartisan gerrymanders. I love 'em, goo-goos hate 'em. Bipartisan gerrymanders pack everybody into homogeneous districts with the same level of inefficiency. Equal inefficiency is awesome! That way, you get a bunch of homogeneous Democratic districts, a bunch of homogeneous Republican districts, and each party wins a share of seats proportionate to its share of the vote, which is what matters to me. Why does that bother goo-goos? No marginal seats. I just don't give a damn about that. Most goo-gooey redistricting reform proposals mix up gerrymandering approaches and try to get rid of partisan gerrymanders while also increasing the number of marginal seats, which is mathematically stupid because increasing marginal seats will also generally create distortions anyway. Do you want proportionality, or do you want marginality? Pick one. Most goo-goos don't even get that the tradeoff exists, try to get both, and then get mad at me when I point out the mathematical problems in their arguments.
Anyway, though, what I will never advocate is a partisan gerrymander, and that leads me to Issue 1. The short version is that it creates a new process requiring bipartisan agreement in the state legislature on a congressional map, along with a supermajority vote requirement. If that fails, it gets kicked around, but eventually reverts to a simple majority with a four-year expiration on the map.
Let's think this through. Bipartisan requirements and supermajoritarian requirements push things towards bipartisan gerrymanders and away from partisan gerrymanders. Awesome! Unless the majority party just decides to run with a partisan gerrymander for four years. They might do it. After the 2010 Census and subsequent round of redistricting, we had a conference here at CWRU, which coincided with the 50th anniversary of Baker v. Carr, which was the Supreme Court ruling that imposed the equal population requirement on districts. I wrote a paper for the conference, subsequently put in our law review (ungated here) calculating how far a party can go trying to take partisan advantage of the redistricting process without having that backfire. I argued that the GOP used the 2010 process to lock in their gains, and go about as far as they could, mathematically, in Ohio without real risk given my calculations. Partisan gerrymanders are sometimes overstated, but they occur. If they expire in four years, though, I'd take that.
Goo-goos might think that the result of this process would be marginal districts, but... no. Either partisan gerrymanders that expire in four years (bad, but less so), or bipartisan gerrymanders (yay!). Either way, this is actually a reform that... I... kind of... like. I'm going to go wash my hands now.
*Goo-goo: Derogatory term for an advocate of "good government" reform, intended to infantilize such people.